The Second Bite or a Poisoned Apple? Reconciling Appellate Review with Finality in the New Architecture of Indian Arbitration

India is pursuing recognition as a global hub for international commercial arbitration through successive legislative amendments and institutional reforms. That ambition continues to be undercut by inconsistent and expansive judicial intervention in the setting aside of awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In response to this judicially created problem, the Draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024 proposes the creation of state-sanctioned appellate arbitral tribunals under a new Section 34A. This paper argues that the proposal is a doctrinally incoherent and structurally flawed legislative overcorrection, born of a trust deficit in the judiciary rather than of commercial demand. Through a historical account of the judicial pendulum of intervention, a textual deconstruction of the proposed provision, a comparison with leading international models, and an economic assessment, the paper shows that the appellate arbitral tribunal framework is at odds with the commercial logic of arbitration. Ostensibly permissive language conceals a de facto mandatory appellate layer. That layer would institutionalise delay, escalate cost, and compromise the core principles of finality and party autonomy. The paper concludes that the appellate arbitral tribunal is a poisoned apple: it would convert arbitration into a multi-tiered litigation process and deter the very international users India seeks to attract. The better path is holistic ecosystem reform focused on arbitrator quality and expeditious enforcement, rather than the addition of another statutory tier of review.