Bolin Hao
This study focuses on the institutional dilemma of adding a third party in arbitration law and its solution path. By analyzing the binary opposition between the scope of effectiveness of arbitration agreements and the principle of one-time dispute resolution, it reveals the problem of judicial resource waste caused by legislative gaps. Research has found that there is a fundamental conflict between the principle of voluntary arbitration and third-party participation, and the limitations of the scope of effectiveness of arbitration agreements further exacerbate procedural barriers. From the analysis of the causes, the deficiencies at the legislative level and the differentiated treatment in judicial practice jointly constitute the root cause of the institutional dilemma, and the differences in rules of different arbitration institutions lead to inconsistent application standards. To solve this dilemma, this study proposes to clarify the conditions for third-party participation through legislation, optimize the special circumstances participation mechanism in arbitration rules, and construct a third-party institutional framework that balances party autonomy and procedural efficiency, in order to achieve a balance between fairness and economy in the arbitration system.