Nengjie Jianga, Pornchai Wisuttisak
The rapid expansion of food delivery platforms has intensified competition in the digital economy, making “Pick One of Two” practices an increasingly important issue in competition law enforcement. While both China and Thailand regulate “Pick One of Two” practices under their respective competition laws, the central challenge lies not in whether such practices should be regulated but in how competition authorities should determine whether they constitute competition law infringements. Drawing on the post-Chicago School as its theoretical perspective, this article aims to examine the shortcomings of Thailand’s competition law framework in determining the legality of “Pick One of Two” practices and to explore how China’s enforcement experience may inform improvements to Thailand’s legal regime. The study adopts a doctrinal legal research method combining comparative legal analysis and case studies. It finds that Thailand’s Trade Competition Act (TCA) exhibits several shortcomings, including an unreasonable standard for determining market dominance, an unclear definition of market power, an insufficient distinction between market dominance and market power, and an inadequate understanding of the competitive nature of “Pick One of Two” practices. In enforcement practice, the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) places excessive emphasis on market share while paying insufficient attention to network effects, lock-in effects, and competitive effects in the platform economy. This article proposes legislative and enforcement reforms for Thailand. Legislatively, Thailand should refine the criteria for determining market dominance and clarify the relationship between market dominance and market power. In enforcement, the TCCT should adopt an effects-based approach that focuses on the anticompetitive potential and competitive effects of “Pick One of Two” practices, rather than solely on actual harm or the voluntary nature of exclusive agreements.