Navigating Chinese-led economic integration: a comparative study of commercial dispute resolution and public policy exceptions in Cambodia, Pakistan and Thailand.

The rapid expansion of Chinese-led economic integration under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has intensified pressure on domestic dispute resolution systems across emerging Asian economies. While international commercial arbitration offers a neutral risk-management mechanism, its effectiveness relies entirely on enforcement by national courts under the 1958 New York Convention. This article investigates the escalating friction between transnational arbitral norms and host-state sovereignty through a comparative doctrinal analysis of Cambodia, Pakistan, and Thailand. Analyzing landmark disputes, the study challenges the orthodox "legal vacuum" theory, which attributes enforcement failures solely to institutional incapacity. Instead, it posits a spectrum model of sovereign shielding. Cambodia exhibits mechanical logistical bottlenecks; Pakistan demonstrates reactive judicial defensiveness stemming from sovereign trauma; and Thailand illustrates a "Capacity-Protectionism Paradox," weaponizing sophisticated administrative law to annul high-value awards. Furthermore, the article introduces the "attribution asymmetry" dilemma, arguing that strict application of the clean hands doctrine inadvertently allows corrupt host states to evade liability while retaining infrastructural benefits, and that the sovereign shielding spectrum is predictive in nature. This research paves the way for future microlevel research to understand hybrid dispute-resolution architectures, including CICC-linked one-stop mechanisms, multi-tier dispute clauses, dispute adjudication boards, and mediated settlements under the Singapore Convention.