Muhammad Yaseen, Korntima Phattanasin
The rise of digital platforms has disrupted global markets by creating data-driven business models and strong network effects, challenging the normative structures of traditional merger control frameworks. These technological dynamics have increased the risk of killer acquisitions, where dominant firms absorb innovative start-ups before they evolve into effective competitors. In many emerging economies, the institutional behavior and legal norms underlying merger notification systems rely heavily on traditional turnover thresholds and price-based assessment tools, failing to capture early-stage digital firms with low revenue but high socio-economic impact. Through a comparative analysis of regulatory frameworks in China, selected ASEAN jurisdictions (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore), the European Union, and international guidance from the OECD and UNCTAD, this paper examines how different legal systems respond to data-driven digital mergers and evaluates their relevance for Thailand's emerging merger-control framework. Thailand is positioned as the central policy case, while other jurisdictions are analyzed as comparative benchmarks representing different levels of regulatory maturity and institutional capacity. The findings reveal a shift in system rationality: advanced jurisdictions have begun integrating non-price factors and more flexible review mechanisms, whereas many developing economies remain bound by traditional, ill-suited normative frameworks. This paper focuses on Thailand as the central policy case, with the aforementioned jurisdictions serving as comparative benchmarks, and provides evidence-based recommendations. To effectively govern digital markets, Thailand must update its legal norms and institutional capacity by incorporating transaction-value thresholds, SSNDQ, data-access analysis, and ex-post review mechanisms to mitigate the disruptive effects of digital concentrations.