METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF NORMATIVE DESIGN OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR CRITICAL AND MILITARY FACILITIES IN A DYNAMIC THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Normative frameworks are essential for establishing baseline requirements in the design of physical protection systems for critical infrastructure and military facilities. However, compliance with prescriptive measures does not, by itself, demonstrate operational sufficiency under dynamic, adversarial threats. This paper analyzes the methodological limitations of compliance-centered design and shows how subsystem-focused verification can yield solutions that remain formally compliant yet fail to interrupt representative attack scenarios within the available time budget. Using a scenario-driven, time-conditioned detection–delay–response perspective, the study systematizes recurrent limitations across conceptual, integration, temporal, informational, and evaluative domains. The findings support a shift from checklist closure to reproducible sufficiency justification based on explicit time budgeting, uncertainty treatment, integrated acceptance criteria, and iterative validation.