Political Power of Bureaucratic Agents: Evidence from Policing in New York City

To what extent can bureaucrats manipulate public service provision for explicitly political ends? Existing research highlights the ability of bureaucrats to influence governments through campaign contributions, endorsements, and election turnout. I explore a more fundamental mechanism: bureaucrats strategically shirking responsibil ities to leverage voters. Politicians rely on bureaucrats to achieve policy goals, which grants bureaucrats considerable leverage. When bureaucrats deviate in preferences from politicians and are politically organized and independent, they can reduce ef fort to exert political pressure. I use data on New York Police Department (NYPD) 911 response times and council members’ preferences on the FY2021 $1 billion cut to the NYPD’s budget. Employing difference-in-differences and spatial difference-in discontinuities designs, I find that police disproportionately reduced effort in districts of misaligned politicians by slowing response times. This study informs the theoretical debate on principal-agent relationships in government and highlights the importance of organized political interests to explain policing in US cities.