Qinghua Qin
Residual maximin share (RMMS) is the largest share threshold that remains guaranteeable throughout dynamic allocation processes, even after previously allocated, lower-valued bundles are removed from the item pool. For additive valuations, recent density-balance analyses established finite-agent lower bounds comparing RMMS with the classical maximin share (MMS). In this paper, we prove that these finite-agent lower bounds are exact. Specifically, if $d_n$ denotes the largest odd integer at most $n$, the worst-case ratio satisfies $\inf_{M,v:\operatorname{MMS}>0}\frac{\operatorname{RMMS}(M,v,n)}{\operatorname{MMS}(M,v,n)}=\frac{2d_n}{3d_n-1}$. Consequently, the exact additive frontier forms consecutive odd-even plateaus and converges monotonically to $2/3$. We then investigate the combinatorial structure of extremal instances. While naive witnesses require $Θ(n^2)$ items, we construct an explicit three-valued family achieving the exact boundary with only linear support: $(5n-3)/2$ items for odd $n$ and $(5n-4)/2$ items for even $n$. Its low-valued block supports two exact partitions that simultaneously certify the MMS benchmark and the residual obstruction. By modeling these dual partitions as a bipartite transportation graph, we prove that this block attains the absolute minimum support $q+d-1=3q$. At minimum support, any two-valued filler is uniquely rigid up to relabeling. Finally, we establish structural characterizations of RMMS. A general min--max representation applies to all finite monotone valuations. For integer additive valuations, we prove that a threshold $T$ is residual self-feasible if and only if every subset cut satisfies a packing-covering condition. Because RMMS is pointwise maximal among residual self-feasible shares, these exact constants establish a tight limitation on the fairness guarantees achievable by share-based lone-divider algorithms.