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◇ arXiv2026-08-24· econ.TH

Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests

Bo Chen, Rui Gao, Jingfeng Lu, Zhewei Wang

原始摘要(英文原文)· Original abstract
A team-contest designer values output rather than expenditure; nonlinear conversion makes the distinction consequential. We study two non-pecuniary instruments in majority-rule contests decided by pairwise all-pay battles with private abilities: disclosing resolved outcomes and splitting the battle schedule into finer blocks. Neither changes a battle's average pivotality; each only redistributes it across histories. Under nested information structures, this redistribution makes equilibrium ability-scaled expenditure weakly more dispersed player by player without changing its mean; expected aggregate expenditure is invariant across all designs considered. The resulting convex-order comparison ranks expected total output: convex output costs favor no disclosure and coarser temporal structures, concave costs favor full disclosure and finer ones, and linear costs make both comparisons neutral. The rankings hold for finite-support and smooth continuous-type ability distributions. The mechanism extends to degree-zero component contest technologies with a unique equilibrium outcome distribution. No and full disclosure bound every admissible public garbling.
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Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests — 科研速览 Science Skim