Akeem Aderayo Saraki
This study reviews the military interventions of the United States through the conceptual lens of strategic legalism, which is perceived to imply the instrumental and selective application of international legal norms to aid, not restrict, the use of force. Leaving behind the question of formal normativity or the doctrine of legality, the study places U.S. interventionist practice in the context of wider security studies discussions on unilateralism, power asymmetry, and the role of international law in global security politics. It propels the research question of the sensitivity of the study, which is whether there is a noticeable difference in the extent, scope, and operational form of U.S. unilateralism across the various legal avenues of using force, that is, self-defense, Security Council authorization, and host-state consent. Using a comparative qualitative study of four empirical cases, that is, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela, the study has shown that a consistent pattern of strategic legalism supports the U.S. security behaviour, although the formal legal grounds invoked by the United States vary depending on the situation. In both instances, legal norms are mobilized, redefined, or evaded in ways that do not compromise strategic autonomy but leave the impression that they comply with a rule-based international order. The conclusions indicate that legality is not so much a neutral restraint on power, but rather a battleground on which power is exercised and conferred legitimacy. By foregrounding legality as a site of power struggle, the study contributes to scholarship on international order and the effects of strategic legalism on collective security, multilateral rule, and the long-term plausibility of international law.