North Korea’s Survival Strategy under Sanctions: The Dual Structure of Political and Economic Rationality

This study analyzes how the North Korean regime has pursued regime survival and political stability under the structural constraints of international sanctions and external isolation. Contrary to previous studies that have characterized North Korea’s policy decisions as irrational and ideology-driven, this paper argues that the regime has exhibited instrumental rationality aimed at maximizing its chances of survival amid external pressure. In addition, this study discusses how such instrumental rationality is implemented from the perspective of selectorate theory. The analysis reveals a dual structure of political and economic rationality within North Korea’s governance strategy. These results are also supported by quantitative tests that convert each form of rationality into measurable indicators. The findings suggest that future international policies toward North Korea should move beyond simple economic coercion and instead be designed with a deeper understanding of the institutional structures through which North Korea’s rationality operates— particularly its mechanisms of learning, adaptation, and regime preservation.