An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of Accounts Receivable Financing Models for China’s New Agricultural Entities in Supply Chain Finance

New agricultural entities are essential to advancing high-quality agricultural development, ensuring food security, and reducing regional wealth disparities. However, due to insufficient creditworthiness, lack of collateral, natural disasters, and information asymmetry, capital shortages have become a significant barrier to their development. The development of supply chain finance offers a novel solution to mitigate financing constraints faced by new agricultural entities. This study incorporates agricultural guarantee institutions into the conventional supply chain accounts receivable financing framework and develops a three-party evolutionary game model comprising ‘new agricultural entities–banks–agricultural guarantee institutions.’ This research study examines the strategic choices of different participants, performs stability analysis and numerical simulation, and offers policy recommendations to enhance the financing accessibility of new agricultural entities. This study proves that integrating agricultural guarantee institutions into the accounts receivable financing framework can help mitigate banks’ credit risks, improve the reliability of accounts receivable, and help the three parties to achieve three-win results. Meanwhile, the findings indicate that penalty mechanisms, subsidy and reward incentives, and risk-sharing frameworks, along with the amounts of accounts receivable and the pledge rate, significantly impact the strategic evolution of financing participants toward a stable equilibrium.