Game-Theoretic Cost-Sensitive Adversarial Training for Robust Cloud Intrusion Detection Against GAN-Based Evasion Attacks

Cloud-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) increasingly rely on deep learning classifiers to identify malicious traffic; however, this reliance exposes them to adversarial evasion attacks in which adversaries craft near-imperceptible perturbations to bypass detection. Existing defenses based on conventional adversarial training often recover robustness against known perturbation patterns at the cost of degraded detection accuracy on canonical attack categories—a robustness–accuracy trade-off that remains an open challenge in the field. In this paper, we propose GT-CSAT (Game-Theoretic Cost-Sensitive Adversarial Training), a novel defense framework tailored for cloud security environments. GT-CSAT couples an improved Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP) threat generator—conditioned on attack semantics to simulate functionally consistent and highly covert traffic variants—with a minimax adversarial training loop governed by a game-theoretic cost-sensitive loss function. The proposed loss function assigns asymmetric misclassification penalties derived from a two-player zero-sum payoff matrix, enabling the detector to maintain vigilance over both novel adversarial variants and well-characterized conventional threats simultaneously. Specifically, misclassifying an adversarially perturbed attack as benign incurs a strictly higher penalty than the symmetric cross-entropy baseline, while the cost weights are dynamically adapted via a Nash equilibrium-inspired update rule during training. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the Cloud Vulnerabilities Dataset (CVD), CICIDS-2017, and UNSW-NB15, which encompass diverse cloud-specific attack scenarios including denial-of-service, port scanning, brute-force, and SQL injection traffic. Under six representative evasion strategies—FGSM, PGD, C&W, BIM, DeepFool, and IDSGAN-style black-box perturbations—GT-CSAT achieves an average robust accuracy of 94.3%, surpassing standard adversarial training by 6.8 percentage points and the undefended baseline by 21.4 percentage points, while preserving clean-traffic detection at 97.1%. These results confirm that the game-theoretic cost structure effectively decouples robustness from accuracy, yielding a Pareto-superior detection profile relative to competing baselines across all evaluated threat models. The source code and experimental configurations have been publicly released to facilitate reproducibility.