Pluralism within limits: how to make the idea of multiple NCC kinds useful.

Recently, several authors have argued that the current impasse in consciousness science supports a pluralistic interpretation: the view that seemingly contradictory findings may both be valid because consciousness can be brought about in different ways, each sufficient to generate conscious experience. We analyze different versions of pluralism to determine under what conditions it offers a viable interpretation of consciousness science. We argue that viable pluralism requires a two-factor framework distinguishing general consciousness factors (mechanisms rendering contents conscious) from content encoding itself. Moreover, neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) kinds must be finite in number and systematically ordered to enable a unified scientific model. While pluralism enables testable hypotheses, significant ontological tensions arise: how can consciousness constitute a unified natural kind if realized by fundamentally distinct NCC kinds? Drawing on philosophy of science, we propose an alternative interpretation in terms of scientific rather than natural kinds. Our goal is not to advocate for pluralism, but rather, to critically examine its viability and implications. Based on this, we urge the field to engage more explicitly with the foundational assumptions that shape consciousness research.