Managerial short-termism, firm-level financial instability, and socioeconomic determinants of health: evidence from Chinese listed firms.

INTRODUCTION: Firm-level financial instability generates economic insecurity relevant to the socioeconomic determinants of health. Stock price crashes are an extreme form of such instability, yet prior work emphasizes information opacity rather than the managerial behavior that lets adverse information accumulate. We ask whether managerial short-termism raises firm-level crash risk. METHODS: Using 27,856 firm-year observations from non-financial Chinese A-share firms (2009-2024, CSMAR), we treat real earnings management (REM) as an observable manifestation of managerial short-termism. Crash risk in year t+1 is measured by negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW) and down-to-up volatility (DUVOL) in fixed-effects models. RESULTS: REM is positively associated with subsequent crash risk, consistently across alternative measures and robustness checks. Longer CEO equity incentive horizons and stronger analyst monitoring attenuate this association, which is stronger in essential-service industries. DISCUSSION: Managerial short-termism is a behavioral source of firm-level financial instability that incentive design and information environments can mitigate. Because endogeneity cannot be fully excluded, the findings are robust associations rather than causal evidence.