Nihad Talib Owaid Al-Humaidawi, Muayyad Shakir Kazem Al-Taie
Iraq has always been, and continues to be, a theater of geopolitical and economic competition between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, representing a hot spot in the foreign policy of both countries due to the intersection of interests and ambitions there. These interests became a wide arena for rivalry and even a central axis of conflict and competition between them. This competition intensified after the year 2000 due to the major transformation in Russia’s strategic posture and economic stability, especially with Russia’s new orientation toward regaining its former influence and protecting its strategic interests in Iraq. In contrast, the United States worked diligently to prevent any Russian influence there. However, Russia challenged American opposition by rejecting most of the UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq that were supported by the United States, even threatening to use its veto against the imposition of further sanctions, particularly the so-called “smart sanctions,” as it placed pragmatic interests above all other considerations. Yet, Russia’s pragmatic interests at the same time compelled it to follow its usual utilitarian policy after witnessing Washington’s insistence on invading Iraq, in addition to certain promises made by the U.S. to Moscow regarding its share of oil after the removal of the Iraqi regime. Thus, Russia abandoned its old ally in exchange for those promises.