Chenglin Wei, Yansen Ding
The perspective of state entrepreneurialism provides a powerful analytical lens for understanding the pivotal role of the Chinese state in land-centered urbanization. While existing literature has extensively documented the macro-level features of this governance model, its internal mechanisms and potential dysfunctions in practice necessitate further investigation. This paper contributes to the state entrepreneurialism literature by highlighting its key mechanism: the state’s strategic devolution of land development and governance rights to market actors. Drawing on a case study of urban redevelopment in Guangzhou, we argue that when this devolution is not accompanied by robust regulatory oversight, it creates a governance failure and fosters market disorder. This process generates significant reflexive effects, where the market instruments deployed by the state paradoxically undermine its own planning prerogatives and lead to a dual failure of both state and market. Our findings reveal a key tension within the state entrepreneurialism model and highlight the importance of “planning centrality” in stabilizing crises arising from market-oriented and speculative urban development.