Hong‐Xiang Hu, Guanghui Wen, Yun Chen, Fan Zhang, Tingwen Huang
Furthermore, for the final social power, it is found that both autocratic and democratic social power cannot be achieved during the evolution, and the average social power of oblivious individuals is larger than that of stubborn individuals, indicating that the network topology has a greater impact on social power than individual stubbornness.
In this article, the evolution of social power is studied within a unified framework comprising two classes of individuals: oblivious individuals and stubborn individuals, whose opinion dynamics are described by the DeGroot averaging model and the Friedkin-Johnsen model, respectively. A proper subset of the simplex is identified to ensure the well-posedness of social power, and it is demonstrated that the corresponding opinion dynamics is convergent for each issue by restricting the initial social power to this proper subset. Through the reflected appraisal mechanism, a nonlinear mapping governing the social power evolution together with its invariant set is derived, and some sufficient conditions with linear time complexity for the convergence of social power are established by proving that this nonlinear mapping is contractive on the invariant set. Furthermore, for the final social power, it is found that both autocratic and democratic social power cannot be achieved during the evolution, and the average social power of oblivious individuals is larger than that of stubborn individuals, indicating that the network topology has a greater impact on social power than individual stubbornness. In addition, it is observed that the final social power ranking of oblivious individuals is consistent with their centrality ranking, and a rigorous lower bound on the final social power is derived for each stubborn individual. Finally, a numerical example is provided to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical analysis.