One size fits all? Procedural competition and contracting outcomes in digital public procurement in Italy

Purpose Public procurement plays a central role in public governance by structuring market access, organizing administrative discretion and supporting accountability through procedural rules. Despite the growing adoption of digital procurement platforms, empirical evidence remains limited on how digital reforms are associated with competitive dynamics and institutional authority beyond technical efficiency gains. This study aims to examine how procedural design within a mandatory digital procurement system relates to contracting outcomes. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes comprehensive administrative microdata on all procurement procedures conducted in 2024 on the Italian Mercato Elettronico della Pubblica Amministrazione, managed by CONSIP S.p.A. This period corresponds to the first full year of implementation of the new Italian Procurement Code (Legislative Decree No. 36 / 2023). Using multivariate count-data models and instrumental-variable estimations, the analysis compares competitive, rule-based Request for Offer with discretionary direct negotiations and examines how supplier participation interacts with procedural design. Findings The results indicate that competitive digital procurement procedures are associated with a higher number of contracts awarded. Moreover, the association between supplier participation and contracting outcomes is stronger under competitive procedures, while participation alone is less strongly associated with outcomes under discretionary formats. Overall, the findings suggest that contracting patterns differ systematically across procedural formats, particularly when competition is embedded within standardized procedural rules. Research limitations/implications The analysis is restricted to a single year and relies on cross-sectional data, which limits the ability to examine dynamic changes over time or establish causal relationships. Social implications The findings suggest that policymakers should complement digital procurement reforms with investments in administrative capacity, standardized procedures and oversight to better support governance outcomes. Originality/value This study contributes to the public procurement literature by providing large-scale empirical evidence on how procedural design within digital procurement platforms is associated with differences in contracting outcomes and administrative organization. By focusing on institutional rules rather than price efficiency alone, it highlights digital procurement as a governance framework associated with the organization of discretion and market access.