Conscientious Objections and Two Ways of Reconciliation.

In the realm of bioethics, discussions on conscientious objection are predominantly categorized into three frameworks: absolutism, the incompatibility thesis, and the compromise account. Advocates of the compromise account attempt to reconcile the principles of absolutism with the incompatibility thesis. Within this framework, there also exist two distinct interpretations. The first is the theory of prima facie right to conscientious objection, which suggests that such objections may leave behind moral residues, necessitating practitioners' referrals to resolve these residues. The second interpretation is the theory of all-things-considered right to conscientious objection, which posits that practitioners must satisfy specific conditions prior to exercising this right, aiming for a compromise that precedes the objection and leaves no moral residues. This article explores the differentiation between virtue-related and impermissible wrongdoings and advocates for a justified conscientious objection based on practitioners' right to commit virtue-related wrongdoings. This stance rejects both absolutism and the incompatibility thesis. It further argues that the theory of all-things-considered right to conscientious objection fares better than the theory of prima facie right. Consequently, it contends that no duty to refer should persist following a conscientious objection.