Ioannis Lianos, Konstantinos Pantelidis
Abstract This study examines the ‘suspended step’ of competition damages claims in Greece, identifying multiple institutional constraints that hinder their development alongside underlying policy choices made during implementation of the European Union (EU) Damages Directive and, more recently, the Directive on representative actions. These factors contribute to Greece’s weak position in the inter-jurisdictional competition ‘game’ fostered by the EU legislator with the aim of ensuring effective judicial protection for victims of anticompetitive conduct. Through empirical analysis combined with a law and political economy approach—a key innovation of this article—the study examines both public and private enforcement of competition law, viewing them holistically. This methodology moves beyond traditional optimal enforcement theory to provide a uniquely comprehensive ‘law in action’ perspective on competition law enforcement institutional design. The findings offer valuable insights for all jurisdictions considering the adoption of mixed public and private enforcement systems for competition law.