Samuel Murray
Neurotechnologies such as brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) and deep brain stimulation (DBS) raise distinctive concerns about human agency. A recent proposal by Schönau et al. identifies four dimensions along which neurotechnologies may threaten agency: responsibility, privacy, authenticity, and trust. The Schönau et al. framework valuably maps how neurotechnologies affect users and has inspired qualitative assessment tools. Yet although it acknowledges interconnections among the four dimensions, it does not explain what structurally unifies them. This represents a key gap in the view. Assessment instruments modeled on the framework, such as their Qualitative Agentive Competency Tool (Q-ACT), evaluate each dimension independently, risking fragmented assessments that miss the integrated nature of agential harm. I argue that agential self-trust unifies these four dimensions. Each tracks a distinct way that neurotechnologies can erode the self-trust constitutive of planning agency: confidence in one's control over action (responsibility), in the boundaries of one's deliberative life (privacy), in one's psychological continuity (authenticity), and in one's sensory and evaluative capacities (trust). This carries concrete policy implications. Current informed consent procedures for neurotechnology trials enumerate risks along separate dimensions without flagging the cumulative threat to a user's capacity for agential self-trust. Likewise, assessment instruments should include integrative measures that track agential self-trust across domains. As neurotechnology governance develops at the international level, a unified account of agential harm within this dimensional framework can guide both consent design and longitudinal monitoring.