How executives succeed at democratic backsliding

This article examines how certain episodes of democratic backsliding lead to more comprehensive forms of executive aggrandizement, even in the face of democratic resistance. Existing literature does not differentiate between limited and comprehensive forms of executive aggrandizement, thus offering limited theorization on the specific strategies that enable presidents to rule by decree without oversight from other branches of governments, remove term limits or massively criminalize dissidence. This study argues that backsliding unfolds as a succession of interconnected executive aggrandizement attempts with varying degrees of depth that encounter different levels of resistance. Executives who combine electoral strategies with subsequent emergency measures are more likely to achieve comprehensive forms of aggrandizement and overcome democratic resistance. In contrast, those who rely solely on one type of strategy tend to achieve more limited results or fail. Electoral strategies rely on plebiscitary legitimacy, whereas emergency-based strategies utilize exceptional powers. To evaluate the theoretical mechanism, the article considers 30 cases of democratic backsliding and selects Venezuela, Hungary, and El Salvador for detailed process tracing of executive aggrandizement attempts. The findings largely support and provide nuance to the proposed theoretical mechanism, offering relevant implications for future research.