Jong Hee Park, Sangkuk Lee
How do meritocratic institutions evolve over time, and under what conditions do they serve as vehicles for social mobility versus instruments of elite reproduction? We examine these questions through the Joseon Dynasty’s civil service examination system (1393–1894), one of history’s longest-running experiments in merit-based bureaucratic selection. Drawing on comprehensive individual-level data covering over 14,000 successful candidates across five centuries, we analyze how family background, geographic location, incumbent status, and demonstrated ability shaped examination outcomes. Our findings reveal the persistent influence of elite family backgrounds alongside consistent evidence that the formal examination pathway functioned as a meritocratic selection mechanism. Preliminary examination performance substantially predicted subsequent success, independent of family origins; yet, this meritocratic channel coexisted with alternative pathways – direct entry, incumbent retaking, and irregular examinations – that systematically advantaged elite families. At the macro level, we track measures of formal equality of opportunity and substantive equality of opportunity across royal reigns, revealing a trajectory from initial openness through progressive elite capture, to partial reform, and ultimately decay. We conceptualize this system as a layered meritocracy – an institution maintaining multiple selection logics simultaneously – and argue that this multiplicity explains both its remarkable longevity and its eventual hollowing as elite families increasingly bypassed competitive channels.