Douglas S. Wilbur
This study analyzes how Vietnamese communist forces used intelligence to guide targeting decisions within a broader information warfare framework. Using mixed quantitative/qualitative content analysis of captured documents (N = 1,300), we find that intelligence indicators predicting social tensions, political divisions, and morale vulnerabilities were the strongest determinants of targeting decisions. Logistic regression indicates that documents containing identifiable vulnerabilities were over twelve times more likely to include operational directives than those without such indicators. Ideological contradiction analysis amplified these assessments, translating intelligence findings into politically charged justifications for agitation, pressure, or selective violence. Narrative framing, while common, served mainly to legitimize actions already shaped by intelligence and contradiction analysis. Together, these mechanisms formed an integrated targeting cycle in which diagnosis, messaging, and coercion operated sequentially to weaken the South Vietnamese state’s political base. The findings illuminate an intelligence-centric model of insurgent targeting with direct relevance for modern information operations and counter-propaganda strategy.