Panch Rishi Dev Sharma
The Sub-national emergency power under Article 356 of the Constitution of India empowers the central government to determine ‘constitutional machinery failure in a province’ and acquire the executive and legislative powers of the provincial governments until the constitutional machinery is restored. The colonial government introduced an undefined and largely unrestrained sub-national emergency power to maintain a stronghold over provincial politics; the colonial provision for sub-national emergency was accommodated by the Constituent Assembly of India to ensure an enabled central government with an undefined and unrestrained power to impose emergency on provincial governments. The application of sub-national emergency powers (121 impositions between 1950 and 2024) has been a regular feature of Indian politics and federalism. This article examines sub-national emergency invocations between 1950 and 2024 in reference to their grounds, justifications, and state of restraints by periodising them in four different constitutional political environments: the hegemonic period (1950–1963), the praetorian period (1964–1988), the restraint period (1989–2013), and the return of hegemonic period (2014–2024) of sub-national emergency in India. By exploring 121 sub-national emergency invocations across different constitutional political environments, the article exposes how Indian central governments have largely employed sub-national emergency power against provincial governments and politics to achieve different objectives. The article reveals that the undefined constitutional nature and largely unrestrained political application of sub-national emergency powers across these periods question India’s claims of federalism, constitutionalism, and democracy.