Hannah B Waldfogel, Brittany C Solomon, Matthew E K Hall
Amid rising political polarization, derogatory rhetoric targeting social groups has become common and highly contested across party lines. These partisan divides are often attributed to disagreement about whether bias has occurred, and theories of social norms, harm-based moral judgment, and cognitive consistency suggest that recognizing bias should track moral condemnation. Yet other theories suggest that recognition and condemnation are psychologically distinct. We propose that, even when partisans similarly recognize explicit bias ("yeah, it's biased"), they may diverge in moral response ("but …")-depending on the target's advantaged or disadvantaged status. Across six prestudies (N = 1,197), eight preregistered experiments (N = 7,145), and 16 supplemental studies, including two preregistered experiments (N = 1,029), we examined this "yeah, but" phenomenon. For speech that partisans equivalently recognized as biased based on race and gender, Democrats condemned bias against disadvantaged targets more than Republicans; Republicans condemned bias against advantaged targets more than Democrats-patterns that extended to endorsing sanctions (Study 1). Partisans invoked the same justifications-invulnerability to harm and honesty-but selectively so, depending on the target (Study 2). These patterns emerged for biases based on socioeconomic status and religion (Studies 3-4), behaviors (Study 5), and partisanship (which lacks a stable status hierarchy; Study 6). However, a status-juxtaposition intervention (judging bias against both advantaged and disadvantaged groups) narrowed Democrats' within-party asymmetry (Studies 7a-b). By disentangling bias recognition from bias condemnation, we show that moral polarization may persist even when Democrats and Republicans both "see" bias and invoke the same moral concerns. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).