Marc Jambon, Judith G Smetana, Noah Battaglia, Jacqueline Di Biase
Although developmental theories have long conceptualized fairness in resource distribution contexts as a component of morality, this view has been challenged recently. Based on findings from two studies, Yucel et al. (2022) concluded that children-and perhaps adults-do not perceive fairness as a moral norm. Using social domain theory as a framework, this article considers (mis)conceptions in Yucel et al.'s definitions and measurement of morality and empirically reevaluates their claims regarding children's and adults' perceptions of fairness. Study 1 used an online survey to examine university students' (N = 306; 18-24 years) judgments and justifications in response to hypothetical scenarios involving straightforward moral and nonmoral norm violations. Participants' reasoning about harm and resource inequality centered on concerns for others' welfare and fairness. Judgments of harm and resource inequality were also less dependent on the existence of norms/expectations than were conventional violations (nonmoral transgressions). Study 2 used interviews to examine whether children (N = 50; 4-8 years) also treat resource inequality as a moral concern. Children judged unequal resource distribution, like harm, as more norm-independent than conventions and provided justifications focused on fairness. In Study 3, a partial reanalysis of data from Yucel et al.'s Study 1 suggested that their failure to detect a significant difference in norm independence judgments of resource inequality and conventional transgressions was likely due to insufficient statistical power. Together these findings suggest that children and adults do perceive distributional fairness as a moral norm as conceptualized within social domain theory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).