Yu-Qi Wang, Boyan Xu, Hao-Lin Yang, Jia-Ji Chen, He-Wen Li, Wen-Zhe Wang, Hong-Cheng Wang
Large language model agents (LLM-Agents) are rapidly entering water treatment and environmental infrastructure, while corresponding regulatory policies and security governance frameworks have not yet fully adapted to the distinctive capabilities and deployment contexts of LLM-Agents, posing new security challenges. Compared with LLMs that only provide recommendations, LLM-Agents can achieve autonomous execution within predefined operational constraints. In particular, the OpenClaw architecture based on reusable skills offers new horizons. This perspective examines the generational evolution of LLM-Agents and systematically analyzes their potential security risks in water treatment and environmental infrastructure from an integrated perspective of system architecture and policy gaps. We identify four core security issues, namely entry risks, execution escape risks, resource consumption risks and skill reuse risks, and propose corresponding mitigation strategies. Meanwhile, in response to the governance needs arising from the widespread application of reusable skill design in OpenClaw, we use wastewater aeration as a representative scenario to illustrate a conceptual skill workflow that organizes seven candidate constraint mechanisms across the triggering, execution and fallback stages. As an illustrative safety-constrained design, this perspective provides a conceptual starting point for mitigating risks in OpenClaw and other LLM-Agent applications in water treatment and environmental infrastructure, particularly where technological deployment is advancing faster than regulatory frameworks can adapt.