Why a Life in Virtual Reality has the Potential to be Just as Meaningful as a Life Outside of it or, in Some Cases, More so

Abstract Using an amalgamated hybrid account of the meaningfulness of life, we argue that conditions for a life to be meaningful are achievable, in principle, by a life lived in virtual reality (VR): what we call a claim to equivalence. An implication of this is that the attributes associated with a meaningful life are not restricted to entities that are contingently biological and immersed solely in physical reality, but are also capable of being satisfied by these same biological entities when they present themselves as virtual agents in a virtual world. We further claim that the extent to which a life is meaningful is dependent on its authenticity, and that authenticity can, for some people, be facilitated by the scope of VR. We defend this claim by drawing on the work of Carl Rogers and subsequent findings from research in VR that draws from Rogers’ theory. Life in VR is therefore not necessarily a hindrance to achieving a meaningful life and might even be aided by it.