The Role of Emotion in Forgiveness

Abstract In this paper I defend the normative power account of forgiveness against the charge that it cannot accommodate the intimate connection between forgiveness and emotion. I look at the grounds for thinking that emotion is central to forgiveness. I then show how philosophers have developed this idea in accounts which make emotional changes definitive of forgiveness. Against such views, I show that serious problems face any attempt to make emotional change definitive of forgiveness. Next, I explain the normative power account and some of its advantages; I show that the normative power account escapes the problems of the emotional change view. I then consider the objection to the normative power account mentioned above: that it cannot adequately explain the role of emotion in forgiveness. I develop this objection by reference to a recent discussion by Luke Russell. I consider two initial responses to this objection that can be made by a proponent of the normative power account: that forgiveness does not always need to be emotional; and that forgiveness can involve undertaking a commitment to emotional change. I then develop the normative power account, explaining two ways in which forgiveness can be ‘expressive.’ The normative power of forgiveness may require emotion for its exercise. And forgiveness may be a powerful expressive action through which the forgiver marks their commitment to an ongoing relationship.