The Covering-Law Model of Explanation in Social Science: Strengths, Limits, and Alternatives

Abstract The covering-law model of explanation has long been at the center of methodological debates in the social sciences. Developed by Hempel and Oppenheim, this model posits that scientific explanations should subsume individual phenomena under general, lawlike principles. Despite its far-reaching influence, the covering-law model has faced significant criticism, particularly in the social sciences, where causal complexity and the absence of strict nomological laws fuel doubts about its applicability. This paper offers a critical assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the covering-law model in the social sciences and engages with contemporary debates on interpretivism, functional analysis, and mechanistic approaches. We argue that, despite all criticism, the covering-law model remains a valuable point of reference for explanations in the social sciences, particularly when combined with insights from structural individualism, recent developments in action theory, and modern conceptions of causality. Furthermore, we discuss its relation to mechanistic explanations and suggest that the purported opposition between the two has been overstated.